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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume XXVIII FEBRUARY, 1943 Number 2
THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHT "NOT TO BE LYNCHED"
VICTOR W. ROTNEM*
INTRODUCTION
Prior to January 25, 1942, Cleo Wright, a Negro citizen of the
State of Missouri and of the United States, had been arrested by
the local police officers of Sikeston, Missouri, was being held un-
der arrest in the local jail, and was facing charges of assault
and attempted rape under the criminal laws of the State of Mis-
souri. On January 25, 1942, in broad daylight, a mob broke into
the jail, seized and removed Cleo Wright, tied his feet to the rear
of an automobile, dragged him through the Negro section of the
town, and then poured gasoline on his body and burned him to
death."
Within forty-eight hours thereafter, the German and Japanese
short wave radio broadcasters featured discussions of the "Sikes-
ton Affair" in all its sordid details. These broadcasts were re-
layed to the peoples of the Dutch East Indies and India at a time
immediately preceding the fall of Java; and listeners were told,
in effect:-
"If the democracies win the War, here is what the colored
races may expect of them !"
Thus the lynching at Sikeston, Missouri, became a matter of in-
ternational importance and a subject of Axis propaganda.
On February 13, 1942, Assistant Attorney General Wendell
Berge requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation to make a
* Chief, Civil Rights Section, United States Department of Justice. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not neces-
sarily those of the Department of Justice.
The author is especially indebted to Professor Elmer E. Hilpert of Wash-
ington University School of Law and Arthur J. Freund, Esq., of the Mis-
souri Bar for their collaboration.
1. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 26, 1942.
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full inquiry into the lynching at Sikeston to determine whether
there was any basis for prosecution by the federal government
of the members of the mob, or other persons concerned. In au-
thorizing the federal investigation, Attorney General Biddle indi-
cated the significance of the incident to war morale, for he
stated:--
"With our country at war to defend our democratic way of
life throughout the world a lynching has significance far be-
yond the community, or even the state, in which it occurs. It
becomes a matter of national importance and thus properly
the concern of the federal government." 2
Although it is a matter of national importance, yet, under our
system of government, there must be found constitutional power
for federal legislation before the federal government can concern
itself through official action ;S and before an act can be made the
basis for federal prosecution, even where there is constitutional
power to legislate, applicable federal legislation must in fact
exist.4
Attorney General Biddle directed that evidence on the lynching
at Sikeston be presented to a federal grand jury. The session of
the federal grand jury to hear this evidence began in St. Louis
on May 13, 1942. On July 30, 1942, the United States Depart-
ment of Justice made public the grand jury's report. The grand
jury returned no indictments but made an advisory report to the
United States District Court. This report recommended both
state legislative and executive action, but it made no recommen-
dation for a federal statute to make the lynching of a person in
custodia legis of the state a federal crime. Nor did the grand
jury find that a federal crime had been committed.
Describing the lynching as "a shameful outrage," and censur-
ing the Sikeston police for having "failed completely to cope with
the situation," the federal grand jury report nevertheless con-
cluded, "with great reluctance," that the facts disclosed did not
constitute a federal crime under existing laws. Still, the grand
jury report stated:-
"In this instance a brutal criminal was denied due process.
The next time the mob might lynch a person entirely in-
nocent. But whether the victim be guilty or innocent, the
2. Dept. of Justice Press Release, April 12, 1942.
3. Kansas v. Colorado (1907) 206 U. S. 46.
4. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin (U. S. 1812) 7 Cranch 32.
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blind passion of a mob cannot be substituted for due process
of law if orderly government is to survive."5
Since there is reason to suppose that the maintenance of due
process of law within the states is a matter of federal concern
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, it is the purpose of this article to re-examine the
question of whether, under already existing federal laws, lynch-
ing a person in the legal custody of a state may not now be a
federal crime. No disrespect for the conclusions of the federal
grand jury is intended. However, the determination of a grand
jury that the facts disclosed do not constitute a federal crime
under existing laws is not conclusive. A final determination of
that question can be had only when an appeal presents to the
United States Supreme Court the opportunity to hear and de-
cide the issue.
LYNCHING AND STATE LAW ADMINISTRATION
The lynching of persons believed by a mob to be guilty of a
crime has been characterized by the Attorney General as "a
matter of national importance" especially in war-time and prop-
erly the "concern of the federal government." Yet, were the
states in these cases sufficiently vigilant in fostering the sur-
vival of "orderly government" there would not be the necessity
or the pressure for federal action.
Lynching is, of course, a state crime whether or not the victim
is a person accused of crime by the state and whether the lynch-
ing results in death or in injury short of death. At the very
least there is an assault in the course of a lynching; if the victim
is a person accused of crime, and especially if he is in the legal
custody of the state, there is as well an obstruction of justice;
and at most there is murder if the death of the victim results.
But, while the greatest of these offenses, measured in terms of
the penalty that could be imposed, is murder, the greatest of-
fense to the peace and dignity of the state is the obstruction of
its justice-its due process of law.
Yet in the states where lynchings most frequently occur, and
especially when the victims are Negroes accused of crime, there
is little likelihood that the mobsters will be subjected to state
5. Report of Grand Jury. (Unpublished). Filed, July 30, 1942. (Italics
ours.)
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prosecution. The action taken by the state officials of Missouri
in the Sikeston affair is illustrative.
The offense against the peace and dignity of the State of Mis-
souri was committed without any attempt at secrecy. It was
perpetrated in broad daylight in a town with a population of
under eight thousand inhabitants. Indeed, dragging the victim's
body through the streets of the Negro section was apparently
designed to give the whole affair a publicity sought by the mob-
sters. Both state and local police officers were present, attempt-
ing, so they said, to reduce the possible extent of the outbreak.0
Yet, the state's grand jury, sitting at Benton, Scott County, Mis-
souri, reported on March 10, 1942, that it had been unable to
find sufficient evidence upon which to base an indictment of
anyone.7
Because of such typical inaction in most of the states where
Negro lynchings are frequent, there has in recent years been
pressure in Congress for a specific bill to make lynching a fed-
eral crime or to provide for exacting a financial penalty from
the subdivision of the state where the offense might be com-
mitted;" but Congress has not enacted such legislation. A fed-
eral inquiry in cases of lynching, such as at Sikeston, Missouri,
is based upon opinions that the action of the mob or the state
and local police officers, or both falls within the purview of ex-
isting federal criminal statutes.
APPLICABLE FEDERAL STATUTES
It is conceded that the lynching of a person who does not stand
in some relation to the federal government--other than his being
merely a private citizen of the United States--has not been con-
stituted specifically a federal crime.- Therefore, it might be
argued that the lynching of a person not yet accused of a crime,
6. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 26, 1942.
7. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 10, 1942.
8. See infra footnote 10.
9. See infra footnote 10.
10. Considerable doubt has been expressed as to whether it is normally
within the power of Congress to legislate against lynchings as such, when
no aspect of federal authority or due process is involved, except in the
indirect way of exacting a financial penalty of the local subdivision which
fails to enforce the peace.
It is possible, of course, in time of war to find federal power to legis-
late in areas that would be denied in peace-time; but here the power, while
not created by the emergency, would come into existence-and presumably
terminate with-the emergency. But there is no sound reason why federal
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or not yet taken into the legal custody of the state, is not a
federal crime where no other relation to the federal government
appears. But it is argued in many quarters that once a person
has been accused of a state crime-and especially when he is in
the legal custody of the state-because he has been accused or
is under arrest for the commission of a crime-he has the right,
under the Constitution of the United States, to a fair and im-
partial trial in the criminal courts of the state; that a mob in
lynching him deprives him of this federally-secured right; that
this deprivation of another's constitutional right is, in effect, an
obstruction of federal justice; and that there now are-besides
the general federal statutes prohibiting under penalty the ob-
struction of justice,"-specific federal statutes making the lynch
mob's deprivation of its victim's constitutional right a federal
crime.
Section 19 of the United States Criminal Code (18 U. S. C. A.
§51) provides:
"If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his
having exercised the same, or if two or more persons go in
disguise upon the highway, or on the premises of another,
with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoy-
ment of any right or privilege so secured, they shall be fined
not more than $5000 and imprisoned not more than ten
years, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any
office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States."
Section 20 of the United States Criminal Code (18 U. S. C. A.
§52) provides:
"Whoever, under color of any law, statute or ordinance,
prosecution for lynchings occurring during the failure of a state's admin-
istration of justice should be predicated on so unusual a situation as the
current war and the adverse propaganda effects of such lynchings; and
many would question whether legislation designed merely-or mainly-to
offset adverse propaganda effects would be commendable.
11. United States Criminal Code §§125-146, 18 U. S. C. A. §§231-251.
And see, especially §136, 18 U. S. C. A. §242 which provides:-
"If two or more persons conspire to deter by force, intimidation, or
threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States, * * *
from attending such court or examination, or from testifying to any
matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such
party or witness in his person or property on account of his having
so attended or testified, *** $5,000 or imprisoned not more than six
years, or both."
19481
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regulation, or custom, willfully subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, an inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penal-
ties, on acbount of such inhabitant being an alien, or by rea-
son of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punish-
ment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both."
Section 37 of the United States Criminal Code (18 U. S. C. A.
§88) provides:
"If two or more persons conspire either to commit any of-
fense against the United States, or to defraud the United
States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more
of such parties do any act to effect the object of the con-
spiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be fined
not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both."
Section 332 of the United States Criminal Code (18 U. S. C. A.
§550) provides:
"Whoever directly commits any act constituting an offense
defined in any law of the United States, or aids, abets, coun-
sels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is a
principal."
A mere reading of Section 19 would seem to authorize the
prosecution of the members of a mob which lynches a person
accused of a state crime while he is in the legal custody of the
state, because he is thus prevented from exercising and enjoying
his right to a fair and impartial trial in the criminal courts of
the state. But this contention has been disputed on the ground
that the guarantee of a fair and impartial trial, secured to such
an accused in the Fourteenth Amendment, is secured only against
deprivation by the state and that the action of the members of
the mob is private and not official, or state, action.12
That lynching cannot be tolerated in a land engaged in carry-
ing the Four Freedoms abroad is hardly arguable; and that
state inaction exists, and will continue to exist, is scarcely sub-
ject to doubt. It therefore is important to reconsider the federal
authority to prosecute the private members of a lynch mob di-
rectly under Section 19.13
12. United States v. Harris (1882) 106 U. S. 629. But see the discus-
sion of this case infra p. 71.
13. This article, as its title indicates, is confined to the applicability of
Section 19 to the conspirative action of individuals in lynching cases. Be-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss2/2
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A RE-APPRAISAL OF SECTION 19
The argument that the acts of the private members of a lynch
mob come within the purview of Section 19 runs as follows:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
It is admitted that in lynching cases, the state as such has not
made or enforced any law which has abridged "the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States" and that neither
has the state denied to "any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws"; and it may be admitted that the
state has not deprived "any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." But merely the obvious is insisted
on. The victim, where he has been accused of state crime and
is in the legal custody of the state, has a "right * * * secured
him by the Constitution * * * of the United States * * *,- under
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, to have a fair
and impartial trial in the criminal court of the state wherein
the crime was duly charged to have been committed. It is also
submitted that the word "trial" is not to be confined to the actual
proceedings in court but that the right to a fair and impartial
trial attaches, in analogy to the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, s at least from the very moment of arrest.'6 When, then, a
yond its scope, therefore, are those cases where Section 20 might be applied
to punish willful action or inaction by state or local officers (cf. Catlette v.
United States (C. C. A. 4, 1943) 132 F. (2d) 902) cases where Section
19 might be applied to punish conspiracy between the officers and the
individuals; or cases where, as will be true in many instances of mob
violence, the factual situation warrants application of Sections 37, 332,
and 20 to punish a conspiracy of individuals to "counsel, command, induce,
or procure" a violation of Section 20 by the state or local officer. To these
charges, the Constitutional objections to the applicability of Section 19
are not pertinent. The pending Federal indictments growing out of a recent
lynching in Mississippi are drawn upon these theories of prosecution, as
well as upon Section 19.
14. The language of Section 19 of the United States Criminal Code, 18
U. S. C. A. §51.
15. Willis, Constitutional Law (1936) 519.
16. And that the analogy has, in effect, been applied, see Brown v.
Mississippi (1936) 297 U. S. 278; Chambers v. Florida (1940) 309 U. S.
227; McNabb v. United States (1943) 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. (Adv.) 579;
Anderson v. United States (1943) 63 S. Ct. 599, 87 L. Ed. (Adv.) 589.
1943]
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prisoner in the custody of the state is taken from such custody
and lynched by a mob, he does not exercise or enjoy the right
secured to him by the Constitution. This is to be sure not a
denial of due process of law by the state, which denial alone is
proscribed by the Constitution operating ex proprio vigore, but
that is unnecessary to the argument. It is not the invalidation
of state action in the federal courts on review which is being
discussed; it is the fault and liability of private persons under a
federal statute for preventing completely and forever a person
from asserting, first, in the criminal courts of the state and,
later, if need be, in the federal courts on review, a right secured
to him by the Constitution of the United States. Operating ex
proprio vigore, the Fourteenth Amendment secures a person ac-
cused of state crime due process of law in the state courts; im-
plemented by the federal statute such an accused person is se-
cured against being prevented by private persons from exercis-
ing a right that the state itself could not constitutionally deny
him. Support for the federal statute may be found in Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides:
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."
In opposition to this argument this objection is raised:
While it is not denied that the Fourteenth Amendment secures
the right to a fair and impartial trial in the state courts and that
this right attaches from the moment of arrest, it is asserted not
only that the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment is
against state and not private action, but also that Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer power on Congress
to regulate the conduct of individuals to induce the enforcement
of the "due process," "privileges or immunities," or "equal pro-
tection of the laws" clauses.
It is submitted, however, that the proposition that Congress
has no power to regulate the conduct of private individuals in
this respect is too broadly stated. The leading decision for this
proposition is the Civil Rights Cases.1 In these cases there was
involved the constitutionality of an Act of Congress which sought
to make it a federal misdemeanor for anyone to deny to any
citizen:
"The full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, ad-
17. (1883) 109 U. S. 3.
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vantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public convey-
ances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public
amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations
established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every
race and color, regardless of any previous condition of
servitude."' 8
The proprietors of certain hotels had been sued for the statutory
penalty or had been indicted for refusing to comply with the
statute at the request of colored persons. The statute was held
invalid by the Supreme Court because (1) the full and equal
enjoyment of hotels, etc., was not a privilege or immunity of
national citizenship' 9 and (2) because the acts complained of
were not state action and the Fourteenth Amendment did not
operate ex proprio vigore on individual action nor did Section
5 thereof authorize congressional legislation directed against
individuals.
On this latter point the Court said:-
"It is State action of a particular character that is pro-
hibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject-matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and
broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all state legisla-
tion, and State action of every kind, which impairs the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or
which injures them in life, liberty or property without due
process or law, or which denies to any of them the equal
protection of the laws. It not only does this, but, in order
that the national will, thus declared, may not be a mere
brutum fulmen, the last section of the amendment invests
Congress with power to enforce it by appropriate legisla-
tion. To enforce what? To enforce the prohibition. To
adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of
such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render
them effectually null, void, and innocuous. This is the legis-
lative power conferred upon Congress, and this is the whole
of it. It does not invest Congress with power to legislate
upon subjects which are within the domain of state legisla-
tion; but to provide modes of relief against state legisla-
tion, or state action, of the kind referred to. It does not
authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for
the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of
redress against the operation of state laws, and the action
18. Act of Congress of March 1, 1875 (known as the Civil Rights Act),
18 Stat. 335, c. 114.
19. On the narrower scope of the "privileges or immunities" clause, see
infra footnote 21.
1943]
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of State officers executive or judicial, when these are sub-
versive of the fundamental rights specified in the amend-
ment."20
It is submitted that the general language in the Civil Rights
Cases, as it would be applied to the problem at hand, is not con-
trolling. In the first place, it was unnecessary to the decision
of the Civil Rights Cases and should be regarded as dictum. If
the enjoyment of equal accommodations in hotels, etc., is not a
"privilege or immunity" of national citizenship under the Con-
stitution, Congress cannot make it so. In the next place, that
decision was under the much narrower "privileges or immuni-
ties" clause and not under the "due process" clause.21 The two
clauses are different in purpose, scope, and operation; and fed-
eral power to legislate under them would conceivably also differ
accordingly. Finally, the federal legislation involved in the Civil
Rights Cases did invade the area of state governmental power;
it sought to create rights as between individual citizens that
were neither established as federal privileges and immunities
nor established unequally between citizens of the several states
as a matter of state law; it required positive social and business
conduct of private individuals on a higher plane of equality than
was required by state law in the states affected; in brief, it did
not, as would Section 19 if applied to lynching cases, merely
require that private persons abstain from denying another the
due and equal course of established state law that would other-
20. (1883) 109 U. S. 3, 11. (Italics ours).
21. In the Slaughter-House Cases (U. S. 1873) 16 Wall. 36, it was held
that a Louisiana statute conferring on some citizens of the United States
a monopoly to maintain and operate slaughter houses in designated Louisi-
ana parishes did not abridge the "privileges or immunities" of other citizens
of the United States who were thereby precluded from engaging in this
occupation, because the "privileges or immunities" of national citizenship
are only such as relate to a United States citizen's functioning with the
federal government. (Citing the right to egress out of and ingress into
the several states in order to reach the seat of the national government
or its various official centers established in Crandall v. Nevada (U. S. 1868)
6 Wail. 35). Among other such "privileges or immunities" peculiar to
national citizenship recognized are: The privilege of expatriation, Talbot v.
Jansen (U. S. 1795) 3 Dali. 133; protection of the government in foreign
countries and on the high seas, Neely v. Henkel (1901) 180 U. S. 109;
protection from violence while in the custody of the federal government,
Logan v. United States (1892) 144 U. S. 263.
This narrow construction of the "privileges or immunities" of national
citizenship was departed from only briefly in Colgate v. Harvey (1935)
296 U. S. 404, 102 A. L. R. 54, which was expressly overruled in Madden v.
Kentucky (1940) 309 U. S. 83, 125 A. L. R. 1383.
The scope of the "due process" and "privileges or immunities" clauses
is strikingly compared in Hague v. The C. I. 0. (1939) 307 U. S. 496.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss2/2
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wise be accorded in the state courts or be required on review in
the federal courts. Had the Court in the Civil Rights Cases
denied the validity of the congressional act involved merely on
the ground that the scope of congressional legislation might not
embrace the creation of new social and business rights in pri-
vate intercourse-that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not "authorize congress to create a code of municipal law
for the regulation of private rights"--that would have been suffi-
cient to sustain the decision. 22 It was not necessary to invalidate
the act in question, then, as well on the broad ground that the
direction of permissible legislation under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment may not in any case be against individual action or con-
duct.
The different scope and operation of the "due process" and
"privileges and immunities" clauses can perhaps be illustrated
in this way. Nearly all the state constitutions have due process
clauses, or clauses of similar content or construction. Therein
their citizens are guaranteed a fair and impartial trial in the
state courts. This guarantee is to safeguard against official
action denying due process of law. But quite apart from such
constitutional clauses, a private person's interference with the
state's administration of justice is in every state, by statute or
common law, a state crime. Still, before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it would never have been claimed that
Congress had the power to make an interference with a state's
administration of justice a federal crime.
Similarly, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution guarantees to citizens of the United States a
fair and impartial trial in the federal courts. This guarantee
again is against official action denying due process of law; and
again, while the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is
not the source of this power, Congress has made interference
with the due administration of federal justice a federal crime.23
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, however,
the measure of due process of law in the administration of the
state's courts is a federal question, reviewable in the federal
courts. The Fifth Amendment, operating ex proprio vigore, is
no less a prohibition against official action only than is the Four-
teenth; yet there can be no doubt that federal legislation making
22. See the language italicized in the quotation from the Court's opinion,
8PM P. 65.
28. See supra footnote 11.
194s]
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it a crime to deprive a person of due process in the federal courts
could be sustained, despite the specious argument that such a
great fundamental right runs in favor of the person to whom it
is secured only as against governmental and not as against
private action.
If this is true under the Fifth Amendment, it would seem to
follow that, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
there is similar power in the federal government to make the
obstruction of justice, even in the state courts, a federal crime.
A person tried in the state courts has a theoretical right to
have the state court's determinations reviewed in the light of
the due process clause under the federal judicial power; and, if
there is a denial of due process of law by the state, this right
to review in the federal courts is very real and effective. To
deprive a person of the opportunity for a reviewable trial, then,
is to deprive him of a right that is not only secured to him by
the Federal Constitution but enforceable and enforced in the
federal courts,--in brief, it is to interfere with the administra-
tion of federal justice, in this sense, itself.
In this view of the matter, there is not only federal "concern"
when "our country is at war to defend our democratic way of
life throughout the world" but there is both federal power to
legislate and existing federal legislation implementing that power
in peace as well as war. When the state itself denies due process
of law in a criminal trial, the federal government grants relief
to the injured person through its courts in review, without the aid
of any statute,-the Fourteenth Amendment operating ex prop7o
vigore. When the functioning of due process of law in a state
criminal action is prevented by private persons, is there not con-
gressional power to make such interference with due process of
law a federal crime? Or, is this the one area of federal consti-
tutional government in which the individual is to be set above
the state? Even to ask that question should startle American
ears!
While the question may be startling, it is one which has been
authoritatively asked and answered previously with diverse re-
sults. In 1904, one Maples, a Negro citizen, was confined in jail
in Huntsville, Alabama, to answer the charge of murder under
the laws of Alabama. Apparently, a mob forcibly removed
Maples from the custody of the Sheriff and a detachment of the
Alabama National Guard, and lynched Maples by hanging him.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss2/2
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Thereafter, certain of the conspirators who were members of
the mob were indicted by a federal grand jury under sections
19 and 20, previously set out herein. The same essential factual
elements appeared there as in the Sikeston lynching. On a peti-
tion by one of the defendants for discharge on habeas corpus on
the ground that the indictment did not charge any offense
against the laws of the United States, the trial court, Hon.
Thomas Goode Jones, rendered an exhaustive opinion,24 sustain-
ing the validity of the indictment. In the course of his opinion,
the court stated:
"When a private individual takes a person charged with
crime from the custody of the state authorities to prevent
the state from affording him due process of law, and puts
him to death to punish the crime and to prevent the enjoy-
ment of such right, it is violent usurpation and exercise, in
the particular case, of the very function which the Consti-
tution of the United States itself, under this clause, [the
14th Amendment] directs the state to perform in the inter-
est of the citizen. Such lawlessness differs from ordinary
kidnapping and murder, in that dominant intent and actual
result is usurpation and exercise by private individuals of
the sovereign functions of administering justice and punish-
ing crime, in order to defeat the performance of duties re-
quired of the state by the supreme law of the land. The
inevitable effect of such lawlessness is not merely to prevent
the state from performing its duty, but to deprive the ac-
cused of all enjoyment, or opportunity of enjoyment of
rights which this clause of the Constitution intended to work
out for him by the actual performance by the state of all
things included in affording due process of law, which en-
joyment can be worked out in no other way in his individual
case. Such lawlessness defeats the performance of the
state's duty, and the opportunity of the citizen to have the
benefit of it, quite as effectually and far more frequently
than vicious laws, or the partiality or the inefficiency of state
officers in the discharge of their constitutional duty. It is a
great, notorious, and growing evil, which directly attacks
the purpose which the Constitution of the United States had
in view when it enjoined the duty upon the state.25
* ** A state officer in attempting to afford due process in
a particular case is discharging a duty imposed upon him,
as the representative of the state, by the Constitution of
the United States, for the benefit of its citizens. The pris-
oner also, while confined and being protected against law-
less violence, that he may have a trial according to the law
24. Ex parte Riggins (C. C. N. D. Ala., 1904) 134 Fed. 404.
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of the land, is in the exercise or enjoyment of a right given
him by the Constitution. Congress may protect the right by
protecting the performance of the duty, and the rights which
flow from it, by declaring that violations of state laws on
the subject constitute offenses against the United States."201
This opinion was rendered in the face of United States v.
Harris,27 hereinafter discussed.2
THE PRECEDENTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY THE "LAW"
Support for the suggested present applicability of Section 19
to cases of lynching persons in custodia legis of the state was
given in 1941 by the Supreme Court itself in the case of United
States v. Classic.2 9 In that case, certain election commissioners
of the State of Louisiana were indicted under Section 19 for hav-
ing improperly and dishonestly counted the ballots in a con-
gressional party primary. A demurrer to the indictment was
overruled on the ground that the defendants had injured voters
and candidates in the party primary by depriving them of the
right, secured to them by the Constitution, to have the votes
properly and honestly counted. This right was found to derive
from Section 2 of Article I of the Constitution, which provides:-
"The House of Representatives shall be composed of mem-
bers chosen every second year by the people of the several
states, * * *."
The position of Mr. Justice Douglas in dissent in the Classic
Case would not deny the applicability of Section 19 to the lynch-
ing cases; for, in objecting to the application of Section 19 to
party primary election frauds, he suggests that it might better
apply to specific personal liberties guaranteed as such in the
Constitution than to a right derived by implication from a sec-
tion of the Constitution which simply provides for the organiza-
tion of the lower house of Congress. Among these specifically
personal liberties one would certainly include the safeguards of
due process of law and equal protection of the laws.
It was on the theory herein advanced and thought to have been
given recent judicial support in the Classic Case0 that many
people expected the federal grand jury investigating the Sikeston
25. Ibid., pp. 409, 410.
26. Ibid., p. 411.
27. (1882) 106 U. S. 629.
28. See infra p. 71.
29. (1941) 313 U. S. 299. See also, Walker v. United States (C. C. A.
8, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 383.
30. See comment (1941) 27 WASHINGTON U. LAw QUARTERLY 125, 127.
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affair to act affirmatively. It appears incongruous to many law-
yers to have the grand jury recognize that due process of law
was denied,"' and thus recognize the relatively recent develop-
ment in this area of constitutional law, and yet, in failing to find
that the facts constitute a federal offense, apparently to rely upon
precedents-such as they are-that very considerably antedate
the development of the modern due process of law concept.
Of Supreme Court cases our search has found but three that
in any way support the view of the scope of Section 19 appar-
ently taken by the grand jury. In United States v. Harris, 2
decided in 1882, a situation was presented on all fours with the
Sikeston affair. A mob had taken a prisoner of the State of
Tennessee out of the custody of the sheriff and severely beaten
him. The victim died as the result of the assault. The members
of the mob were indicted under Section 19, but a demurrer to
the indictment was sustained on the ground that, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress had no power to legislate
with reference to the conduct of private individuals, since the
Fourteenth Amendment is directed by its terms only to state
action. But it is submitted that Section 19, as it was sought to
be applied in the Harris Case, did not come within the doctrine
later accepted and embodied in the Civil Rights Cases. In the
Harris Case the private individuals were not withholding from
the victim business and social intercourse concerning which Con-
gress may not legislate under the "privileges or immunities"
clause; they were preventing the victim from exercising a right
which he could, with the aid of the federal courts and through
the federal jurisdiction provided in the Constitution, claim ef-
fectively against the state. The legislation sought to be applied
in the Harris Case, unlike that in the Civil Rights Cases, would
not have set up a code of civil conduct for individuals but would
merely have punished individual interference with the state
government which would otherwise provide, or be compelled in
the federal courts to provide, due process of law.
The second case relied on to deny the applicability of Section
19 to members of lynch mobs is Hodges v. United States,33 de-
cided in 1906. Here certain private individuals were indicted for
having intimidated Negroes into leaving private employment.
31. See supra pp. 58, 59.
82. (1882) 106 U. S. 629.
33. (1906) 203 U. S. 1.
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A demurrer to the indictment was sustained by the Court on the
ground that the right to be employed in private industry is not
a right secured by the Constitution. It will be noted that the
basis for this decision is quite different from the basis of the
decision in the Harris Case. In the Harris Case, it was the oper-
ation of the federal statute upon individuals as such, that was
found objectionable; in the Hodges Case, it was objected that
the action complained of did not prevent the exercise of any
right secured by the Constitution-in keeping with the Civil
Rights Cases notion of the narrow scope of the "privileges and
immunities" of national citizenship.34 In the Harris Case, the
victim was in custodia legis of the state; in the Hodges Case
the victims were not accused of crime nor in the legal custody
of the state. In brief, the Hodges Case of and by itself is not
authority contrary to the views herein advanced as to the ap-
plicability of Section 19 to lynching cases.
But in the third case, Powell v. United States,31 the precise
issue here under consideration was presented. A federal grand
jury indicted the members of a mob which had seized, taken
from state custody, and lynched a state prisoner. The trial court
sustained a demurrer to the indictment; and the Supreme Court,
on the sole authority of the wholly distinguishable Hodges Case,
and without reference to the Harris Case, affirmed the trial court
in a decision without opinion! Such are the Supreme Court
authorities opposed to the theory that members of the Sikeston
mob were subject to federal prosecution under Section 19!
Moreover, it is significant to note that all three of these cases
were decided long before the development of the idea that an
appeal lies to the federal courts by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment from a state court if it fails to provide due process
of law.36 This development dates only from the 1920's, while
the Harris Case dates from 1882, the Hodges Case from 1906,
and the Powell Case from 1909. Many of the rights we now
regard as secured by the Constitution were at that time unrecog-
nized; but, since they are now recognized, decisions denying
that they are within the purview of a statute that makes pre-
vention of their exercise a federal offense should no longer be
34. See supra footnote 21.
35. (1909) 212 U. S. 563.
36. See Green, J. R., "Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment" (1942)
27 WASHINGTON U. LAw QUARTERLY 497.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss2/2
FEDERAL RIGHT "NOT TO BE LYNCHED"
controlling. As the concept of constitutional rights and privi-
leges expands, so must-and should-the statute that provides
a sanction against interference with them enlarge. And in this
direction the Court pointed in United States v. Classic"7 in 1941.
CONCLUSION
A grand jury is not the final arbiter or even a persuasive voice
of what comes within the purview of either the Constitution or
the statutes of the United States. In view of the doubts shed upon
the theory, if not the result, of the Harris Case in the Hodges
Case, in view of the clear distinction between the facts of the
Hodges Case and the Powell and Sikeston situations, in view of
the unsatisfactory basis for the decision in the Powell Case, in
view of the development of due process of law subsequent to all
these cases, and in view of United States v. Classic--it would ap-
pear that the grand jury in the Sikeston matter should have over-
come its "great reluctance," returned indictments, and left to
the final arbiter in our constitutional system, the Supreme Court,
the clarification of this important area of the law.
The evil of lynchings exists and doubt as to whether or not
federal power now exists to remedy it can only adversely affect
our national morale. Hence, it is highly desirable that whatever
doubt that may exist be authoritatively resolved.
37. (1941) 313 U. S. 299.
It is interesting to find that a South Carolina court in Kirkland v. Allen-
dale County (1924) 128 S. C. 541, 545, 123 S. E. 648, 649, refused to inter-
p ret narrowly a State Anti-Lynching law on the ground that it was not
dealing with an ordinary criminal statute where the rule of narrow con-
struction would apply but with the statute intended to make effective the
constitutional guarantees of due process. The court formulated the rules of
construction for such cases as follows:
"Since the statute does not purport to cover any broader field than the
self-executing provision of the Constitution, in so far as the question
here involved is one of construction, it is to be resolved by applicable
rules of constitutional construction. That it is a fundamental canon of
construction that a Constitution should receive a liberal interpreta-
tion, especially with respect to provisions which were designed to pro-
mote the security and safeguard the liberty of the citizen, is well
settled. 6 B. C. L., p. 49, §44. That the salutary object of this con-
stitutional provision was to promote, through the means prescribed,
the observance of certain other provisions of the constitutional charter,
guaranteeing the citizen against deprivation of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law, etc., is not open to question. See
Brown v. Orangeburg, 55 S. C., 45; 32 S. E., 764; 44 L. R. A., 734.
Another familiar general principle of interpretation of Constitutions
is that a provision should be construed in the light of the history of the
times in which it was framed, and with due regard to the evil it was
intended to remedy, so as to give it effective operation and suppress
the mischief at which it was aimed."
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